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Are They Good? Are They Bad? Double Hermeneutics and Citation in Philosophy, Asphodel and Alan Rickman, Bruno Latour and the ‘Science Wars

Babette Babich

Fordham University, babich@fordham.edu

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1. Redoubling Ginev’s Double Hermeneutics

I have had the privilege of knowing Dimitri Ginev for several years. The late physicist and philosopher, Patrick Aidan Heelan was one of the first to tell me about the brilliance of Ginev’s work since their own encounter at the University of Pittsburgh. We are the two of us, fellow travelers in the philosophy of science, particularly in that subfield of continental philosophy of science, a rigorously hermeneutic tradition for Ginev and for myself (as it was for Heelan and Joseph Kockelmanns among others). ¹ Although we differ in many ways, we are in agreement regarding the necessity of plural approaches to philosophical reflection and the importance of taking account of, to use Ginev’s own expression, “the work of growing number of authors who are engaged in developing a full-fledged ‘hermeneutic alternative’ to the analytical philosophy of science”² all for the very philosophical sake of the philosophy of science as such.

One arena in particular, namely a reflexive reflection on hermeneutic reflexivity, what Ginev echoing the sociologist Anthony Giddens, names “double” hermeneutics,³ has reverberations that continue to strike me as key to the future of any philosophic reflections on science robust enough to consider the multifarious dimensions of hermeneutic inquiry as re-

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search methodology. I put this in such a complex and critically Kantian fashion because more is at stake than is usually indicated when philosophers speak of diversity or pluralism. It is significant that mainstream or analytic philosophy when it calls for pluralism or diversity does not intend to include continentally styled approaches. As an ideal, ‘pluralism’ is rarely realized if admirable: expressive of political openness and respect. And even as an ideal, it seems bound to shipwreck, not least for the Kantian reasons concerning the bounds or peripheral limitations upon “the land of truth,” surrounded by

“a wide and stormy ocean, the native home of illusion ….deluding the adventurous seafarer ever anew with empty hopes, and engaging him in enterprises which he can never abandon and yet is unable to carry to completion” (KdrV, B 295 A 236)4

The Kantian image of limit, temptation and deception—“many a fog bank and many a swiftly melting iceberg”5 (Ibid.) — inspired Nietzsche’s reflections on scientific truth and he drew on this metaphor, referring to both Kant and Schopenhauer in his first book researching, with the means of classical philology and history, the nature of ancient Greek tragedy, when he wrote that “science, spurred by its powerful illusion, speeds irresistibly towards its limits where its optimism, concealed in the essence of logic, suffers shipwreck.”6 Scientific research includes the prospect of departing upon a “wide and stormy ocean,” and thus venturing “upon this sea,” and leaving the island Kant calls the “land of truth,” that is, the “territory of pure understanding, including its inalterable limits” [unveränderlichen Grenzen], limits that were, to cite the German, “durch die Natur selbst ... eingeschlossen.”7

Thus the very emphasis on limit and risk could attest in advance not only to what Peter Strawson famously called the ‘bounds of sense’ but al-

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5 Ibid.
6 “For the periphery of the circle of science has an infinite number of points; and while there is no telling how this circle could ever be surveyed completely, noble and gifted men nevertheless reach, e’er half their time and inevitably, boundary points [Grenzpunkte] on the periphery from which one gazes into what defies illumination.” Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, §15. I discuss Nietzsche and Kant in Babich, “Nietzsche’s Critique: Reading Kant’s Critical Philosophy” in: Mark Conard, ed., *Nietzsche and the Philosophers* (Lanham, MD: Rowman Littlefield, 2016), pp. 171–192.
so speaking of philosophical discourse as such, the seemingly inevitably failure of pluralism. And to be sure, this was witnessed, as it were, in medias re in a reflection on 'state of philosophy in the US which Reiner Schürmann first published in Paris in the mid 1970s.8

The point could be made in other ways, with reference to Kuhn and normal science, normativized as such discussions usually are. Or one could invoke the currently popular discourse of post-truth. But reading Heelan, reading Ginev, reading Heidegger, a continental philosophy of science is not merely an approach to philosophy of science, to be counted among routinely “analytic” and mainstream approaches to philosophy of science, in a ‘pluralistic schema.’ Much rather, as I have observed, it was the point of departure for Nietzsche Wissenschaftsphilosophie,9 the only way to begin to do justice to real science, science as such, historically speaking, including all the complex details — wie es eigentlich gewesen — that same science that mainstream history of science finds awkward in its accounts of the history of chemistry, including the elements of alchemy as Peter Dear and especially as Lawrence Principe have detailed these for us,10 but not less as these bear on the philosophy of chemistry,11 is to include and even to foreground hermeneutic philosophy of science, where Ginev's double hermeneutics is indispensable.

But hermeneutics is a conflicted term: scientists don’t like it — it is not for nothing that Alan Sokal’s hoax article includes the term in its title. And social scientists in the wake of Giddens and much more Taylor and Geertz (all of whom use and all of whom ultimately abandon the term as they themselves ascend in mainstream prominence), increasingly eschew

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8 Reiner Schürmann offers the following definition of pluralism describing the so-called pluralist’s movement in American philosophy from, as it were, the ground: “Who are they? To know this contesting coalition, it is enough to remember the successive purges since the war and draw up the list of those who were rejected. The ‘pluralists’ were, therefore, born from an alliance between classical pragmatists, historians of European philosophy, speculative metaphysicians who were followers of Whitehead, and phenomenologists in the specific sense.” Schürmann, Social Research, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Spring 1994): 89–113, here p. 108. Originally published in Le temps de la réflexion, 6 (1985): 303–321.


11 See for example Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent and Isabelle Stengers, The History of Chemistry (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996) and Japp van Brakel as well as the contributions to Baird, Scerri, and McIntyre, eds. Philosophy of Chemistry: Synthesis of a New Discipline (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006). For further references and a review of this specifically disciplinary claim, see Babich, “Towards a Critical Philosophy of Science.”
the term. And in philosophy overall, the many and varied discontents inherent to the reception of hermeneutic approaches inspired, at least in part, my book, *La fin de la pensée. Philosophie analytic contre philosophie continentale*. An inherently hermeneutic study, I was concerned to explore misunderstandings of a linguistic kind, a challenging study that was compounded by having been written, not from the disciplinary viewpoint of sociolinguistics, but philosophy, and not from a Parisian philosopher’s but only a New York philosopher’s perspective.

As a scholar, one writes and speaks across different linguistic traditions, German and French and English (to name the languages I speak) and cannot but miss the languages one does not speak, in this case, singularly because it is Ginev’s language: Bulgarian, etc. These divides punctuate the point Heidegger insists upon in his lecture course on Hölderlin’s *The Ister*, “Tell me what you think of translation, and I will tell you who you are.” Heidegger’s point is often elided, one can be distracted by the visceral appeal of the formulaic — Heidegger’s phrase echoes both Feuerbach and Brillat-Savarin — but it is worth attending to his own reflections in his own defense, as a hermeneutic counter to the philological critique that came hard on the heels of his readings of Hölderlin in particular but not less Johann Peter Hebel as well as the Greeks and to this listing we might as well add his reading of Nietzsche inasmuch as such disciplining critique constituted an all-purpose rebuke, one that dogged Heidegger from the start.

Here (reprising his reading of Sophocles’ *Antigone* in *Introduction to Metaphysics*), Heidegger cites his translation of “τα δεινά, το δεινόν. We translate: das Unheimliche, the uncanny,” reflecting, that as enunciated “this translation is initially alien to us, violent, or, in ‘philological’ terms, ‘wrong.’” In context, Heidegger goes on to articulate the determinative question of decision as the hermeneutic question of standards but not less with recourse to modality of exceptions (the allusion to Carl Schmitt is, I think, relevant):

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12 There are, obviously, several exceptions one might mention but alas, and in general, the point continues to hold. I explore some of this in my introduction to my edited collection, *Hermeneutic Philosophies of Social Science*, a collection including an earlier version of this chapter: “Hermeneutics and Its Scientific Discontents.”


14 It is relevant that *La fin de la pensée* would inspire, in part, a conference on sociolinguistics in Tours in June of 2016 and some elements of my keynote at that conference are included here.


17 Ibid.
who decides, and how does one decide, concerning the correctness of a translation? We ‘get’ our knowledge of the meaning of words in a foreign language from a dictionary or ‘wordbook.’ Yet we too readily forget that the information in a dictionary must always be based upon a preceding interpretation of linguistic contexts from which particular words and word usages are taken.18

Heidegger’s reflection exceeds any reference to the politically correct notion of pluralism with which I began above and to the same extent hermeneutics radically undergirds contextual and critical reflection. This is not an already accomplished task, and in *La fin de la pensée*, I attempted to pose the question of different kind of hermeneutic translation, political and contextual regarding ‘continental’ and ‘analytic’ styles of doing philosophy, whereby the latter stylizing had been already and for some time successfully ‘translated’ from English into French as indeed into other language contexts especially German but also Italian and perhaps above all throughout the Scandinavian countries and so on. My reflection on the expat fate of philosophy in its analytic modality, reviewed the destiny of Anglo-American thought, as transposed to the Collège de France.19 My focus was France. What my text lacked (one always knows this after a book is written) was sociology, which is to be sure not my field: a sociology of academic knowledge, a sociology of knowing at the level of university philosophy, such as Herbert Butterfield’s *The Whig Interpretation of History*, Fritz Ringer’s *The German Mandarins*, updated for our time and applied not to the university as a whole, these books exist, I can name the former philosopher of science Steve Fuller’s *The Sociology of Intellectual Life*20 as well as more specific to philosophy, the applied philosophers, Bob Frodeman’s and Adam Briggle’s *Socrates Tenured*,21 but neither of these books are hermeneutically addressed to the question of the profession of philosophy in general, and of philosophy of science more specifically.

For it is key to a hermeneutic reflection such as I think, along with Ginev and Kockelmans and Heelan would be needed, to note, even without sociological force (I use the term ‘force’ advisedly, recalling because it is sufficient to recall the title alone of the 2001 documentary on Pierre Bourdieu’s thinking *Sociology is a Martial Art*) that scholarly convention dissolves hermeneutic reflections in advance, disarming them before they

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18 Ibid.
19 This is so despite the geographically “continental” roots of the Vienna Circle or, in the persons of Auguste Comte, of positivism as such.
begin, claiming there is no real issue in bringing in the term hermeneutics: philosophy is philosophy is philosophy. And the only distinction to be made is that between the good and the bad. Such claims presuppose a university standard issue notion of philosophy, i.e., mainstream, analytic (and it is important, considering the rhetoric of professional philosophy as such that is qua as rhetoric, to emphasize what it means to say that something is a “claim,” a pronunciation), what is thereby asserted is that there is no difference between so-called analytic philosophy and continental philosophy.

Yet analytically formed (and informed)22 approaches make up the majority of philosophical reflection on thinkers traditionally regarded as “continental,” including most Nietzscheans in the UK, especially those with university posts, as well as the US (there are almost no Nietzscheans left occupying chairs of philosophy in Germany, never mind the number of Heideggerians, down to negative values by now in the wake less of the Black Notebook scandals than of the rise of analytic modes — although and as if to assuage both challenges with a blow, the Heidegger chair in Freiburg is now occupied by a Nietzsche scholar, and the near ubiquity of the speaking of English in philosophy seminars). Husserlians have long been analytically minded and so on. What is relevant is that few professional philosophers regard any of this as a problem inasmuch as it is commonly supposed that those people recruited for professorial are the best, and that there are only good and bad ways, where ‘good’ means analytic, to “do” philosophy.

So we are told. But, and this is the reason for recalling Heidegger’s hermeneutic reflection on translations and their discontents, who makes this assessment? Who makes this judgment? To begin with, the only judgments are academic ones, issued by scholars who have themselves enjoyed, largely without exception in recent years, an analytic formation. As a result, and this could be high satire were it not the story of an academic power play, one’s philosophical colleagues including colleagues writing in from University of Chicago Law School (this is he who must not be named) condemn as not being philosophers those with any other formation, condemning one’s colleagues then as “postmodern” (this is yesterday’s news and yesterday’s insult) like those who calumniated Jacques Derrida, in so many terms, as being not a philosopher but an “astrologer.” This ontological exclusion is effected by nothing more than name-calling and it is effective especially among analytic philosophers.

This then is nothing less egregious than an academic déformation professionelle. By pointing this out, I am only highlighting conventions and

22 This is a matter of training and formation, thus it is also an economic matter of who is hired and who is not, who is published and who is not, who is read and cited, and who is not.
yet, as Nietzschean reminded us, like our convictions, conventions, what things are called, this was the theme of On the Genealogy of Morals, are the hardest things to articulate.

2. Tübingen to Berlin: The Rise of Analytic Philosophy and the Case of Manfred Frank

My German colleagues in philosophy despair of being cited and I have heard various complaints of this kind over many decades. At the same time it should be noted that philosophy, especially when it is compared with other fields in the human sciences, like psychology and like sociology, could be said to be distinguished among the human sciences by its lack of citation practice. Indeed philosophers generally cite so very sparingly this lack of citation has elicited professional notice and reflection, intriguingly borrowed from sociology.

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Fig. 1. Jim Moody’s Sociology Cites

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23 See Kieran Healy’s blog: “A Co-Citation Network for Philosophy,” June 18, 2013, in which Healy references (the reference is coordinate or reciprocally informed by) Neal Carren’s “A Sociology Citation Network” the model for his study (2012) which in turn drew upon Healy drawing on other work (Dan Wang) looking at economic sociology: https://kieranhealy.org/blog/archives/2013/06/18/a-co-citation-network-for-philosophy/
In addition to the very useful visualization prized by our academic culture (I refer elsewhere to what Ivan Illich has called the “age of the show” and, among other things, this is why we love such graphics), in the 2009 graph produced by Jim Moody (for me the most telling part of this is the notice that in citation fact as opposed to citation fantasy, “only one piece of work in the Top 50 citations was published before 1965, and that’s Weber (1922).”

Moody’s graphic image (Fig 1), shows a great deal about sociology but when it is taken as a model for a parallel representation of philosophic citation things become even more interesting because there is even less citation (or pluralism or diversity). The Duke University Sociologist Kieran Healy’s shifting graphic really rewards investigation but cannot be reprinted even as a diagram simply because the dynamic movement of web publication is essential to his (to my mind the most fun) interactive diagram: and rather than the footnote the link to this web reference, I include it here: https://kieranhealy.org/philcites/.

Fig. 2. Kieran Healy’s Philosophy Cites.

Significant here is the claim that, and this is limited to analytic philosophy rather by definition (given that the sample size is drawn only from analytic journals) that “Our 2,200 articles and 34,000 citations works out to an

average of about 15 citations per paper." The overall graphic, which unlike Moody's sociology graphic I do not replicate here, is diffuse, not least because organized around clusters of specialization, and, regrettably, philosophy of science is not indicated but this graphic of "ethics, metaethics, and political philosophy" is instructive owing to its thinness.

It is common to note that most journal articles, not merely those in philosophy, are destined to go unread. But there is also a culture in philosophy, especially analytic philosophy, that cultivates a systematic practice of systematic non-reading. Marcus Arvan observes, correctly I think, and to my mind his comment highlights a moraline tendency, to use a Nietzschean term, regarding some of the reasons behind this practice of non-citation:

To fail to cite a paper simply because you think it is “bad work” or not worth paying attention to is not the function of citations — for it simply misleads the reader into thinking that work on the subject has not appeared when in fact it has. A more fundamental problem with the practice of citing “only things you find relevant” is that it invites bias, exclusion, institutional capture (i.e. “publication rings” of people just citing their friends’ work), etc. (biases, exclusion, etc. ...)

Part of this scholarly obliviousness in all ‘bad faith,’ which is to say in all good conscience, may be ascribed to the same analytic orientation that excludes past names and concerns as what it calls “history of philosophy.” Thus only the same (contemporary) names are cited, be they names known only to the researchers themselves (citing one’s friends) or be they the old standbys, Dennett, Dummett or Lewis, or Putnam, or Bernard Williams or Stanley Cavell et al.

If I noted above that German scholars seek to be “engaged,” or cited or acknowledged, the issue itself is an inherently Hegelian one: what is wanted is recognition by one’s Anglophone counterparts. Yet the reigning explanation for non-citation in Germany today is not that analytic philosophical modalities tend not to privilege citation (as is alas empirically the case) but rather that such non-citation results from the fact that one has written one’s work in German. Thus a remedy is sought by writing and lecturing in English. Given the above graphic, it comes as no surprise that although German philosophy in major universities has been analytic for

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25 Kieran Healy, "A Co-Citation Network for Philosophy." https://kieranhealy.org/philcites/
26 Ibid.
years and although authors have been publishing in English accordingly the tactic has yet to bear fruit.

Manfred Frank, one of the original architects who first presided over the importing of analytic philosophy into Germany together with the late Rüdiger Bubner, both of whom enthusiastically recruited analytic philosophers to Tübingen, recently wrote to protest with respect to the Humboldt University in Berlin: “Hegel doesn’t live here anymore.”28 In France, the same could be said of most university philosophers — apart from Alain Badiou, who has, if nothing else, sheer staying power, and with the exception of Bruno Latour, although Latour is rarely cited in philosophical circles, apart from the OOO enthusiasts he himself seeks to keep at a distance. Nevertheless Latour fulfills the profile suggested above: he writes in English and he is friendly to the received view. Other exceptions include the late Umberto Eco and Gianni Vattimo in Italy, and Slavoj Žižek, who likewise speaks and writes in English.

Obviously enough the Anglophone philosopher’s failure to cite his or her German and French colleagues is a bit more simple than a linguistic divide: in addition to the sparseness of philosophical citation practice (everyone writes in a vacuum of only a few names) English and American analytic philosophers cite only one another. Nor is any style other than analytic (or mainstream) tolerated which stylistic detail excludes hermeneutics from the get go.

But I am not writing to argue that the remedy can be found simply by switching everything to sociology even if what is at issue is sociolinguistic, an inherently hermeneutic discipline, even if does not so name itself. Sociology, too, has its own hermeneutic discontents, like ethnography, which was Latour’s original research field following his original formation in philosophy. In an academic context, hermeneutically speaking, decisions about the quality of a text, decisions regarding a letter of application, a book, a lecture, are made instantly, even if remade constantly, because, often in light of the first judgment. Hence Gadamer will speak of prejudice and Bourdieu, also himself originally trained in philosophy, wrote an important book about distinction. A full elaboration of “distinction” in the academic sense remains to be worked out across the disciplines: sociology, political theory, ethnography, philosophy, and linguistics or rhetoric would also matter (the field that is sometimes called cultural studies or just theory), which undertaking would seem valuable at least owing to the status-driven, discriminatory, evaluative or measuring

context of the university as such. 29 Calling for such a project is an invitation to reflect on what must be presupposed as the basis for any future reflection that may come forth as a reflection.

At stake are issues that concern us, whatever our formation, in our deepest prejudices as academics: members of the university profession, who live and breathe the life of the mind, as Hannah Arendt conveyed this as politically as she did. Hence we are persuaded that if only we could get our style right, the words right, our punctuation right, we, all of us, would have success in our grasp. This faith preserves the power of those in power. We are told that certain techniques increase what Bourdieu distinguished as kinds of “capital,” socio-cultural capital. 30

Socio-cultural capital includes language. For this reason, in the US and the UK as also in Germany, job applicants for desirable positions can hire coaches to help them acquire linguistic skills, mostly a matter of seeming to have such skills, just as makeup and dress are used for the sake of appearance (as Nietzsche teased in the section entitled “What is Noble?” of Beyond Good and Evil, “and how much ‘slave’ still remains in woman, for example! — which seeks to seduce one to good opinions about oneself” as slavish elements, Nietzsche diagnoses these elements and tactics as “remnants of the craftiness of the slave —”, reflecting that “it is likewise the slave who immediately afterwards falls down before these opinions as if she herself had not called them forth.—”). 31 A great deal of cosmetic surgery attests to this truth, in fact and to be sure, the entire futurist and transhumanist movement attests to this truth. More prosaically: is a good web page or Twitter ranking due to anything other than digital cosmetics? Nietzsche’s Stoic and ancient sobriety diagnoses the meagre qualities of the sort of vanity delighted by the feeblest good report about oneself — and what could more feeble than a Facebook ‘like’? — matched only by the pain elicited by a slight on the same level? Thus Nietzsche underlines our lack of the “pathos of distance” as only this pathos, only distance, characterizes the noble.

In the US, one legal author has written lamenting the (injustice) of the Beauty Bias. 32 But in the UK a book by Catherine Hakim, a sociolo-
gist at the London School of Economics, urges young women to gather what rosebuds they may while they may: entitled *Honey Money*.超越性的吸引力（尤其是青春的吸引力）因为这种性吸引力的紧急性，像许多投资一样，是一个时间有限的，

“good” cv or letter of application is a properly cosmetic stylization, dressing the facts of one’s life, to the end of ultimate success?

3. Coding: Severus Snape on Compounding Asphodel with Wormwood

To illustrate the role of language in seemingly neutral settings, I have written on J.K. Rowling’s *Harry Potter*, particularly the character of Professor Severus Snape, arguing the actorly, *acteurly*, importance of Alan Rickman’s characterization, reflective as it was of Nietzsche’s *pathos of distance*, of Snape.34

Key to both film and book is language. Everything turns on the linguistic: the Latin of the spells, the names of the characters Potter, Dumbledore, Snape, including, the almost Lacanian codification of Voldemort: “He-who-must-not-be-named,” as in the sibilance of the snake itself, the name of the house Slytherin, magnified in the film with the voice of Alan Rickman.

Alan Rickman who played villains, seemingly for the fun of staging villainy, liked to insist on little things: hence the same costume, buttons buttoned down all over, points de capiton, as Lacan would say, and hence and this is of the essence of *improvisation*, Rickman also played his Professor Snape rather differently than J.K. Rowling had initially written him into being.

Beyond the virtuosity of Alan Rickman, the *Harry Potter* films give us an abundance of actors with all the gifts of the stage in a film of costumes and magic. If costume and special effects are everyday matters at


the magical school of Hogwarts what is not par for the course, as it were, is Rickman’s Snape’s perfunctory, spare and dry, language, which is to be sure and classically, an interest-generating strategy. Snape’s first line when he meets his class: “There will be no foolish wand waving or silly incantations in this class,” seems less than promising: the whole point of Hogwarts is all about the wands: and what else can witchcraft and wizardry be about if it is not about incantations? And Rickman’s professorial tone is a patently unfriendly one: this is nobody’s idea of a nice teacher. His Snape does not smile, frightening his students in deliberate provocation, supercilious and authoritarian: “I don’t expect many of you to appreciate the subtle science and exact art that is potion making” and he pauses, Rickman is good at pauses: “However,” he interrupts himself, to add, with further pauses, “for those select few … who possess … the predisposition…”

Thus in the first moments of the class, Snape sets a series of difficult questions on potions, and, although seemingly keen on answers, pays no attention to the eagerly clever Hermione Grainger, although her hand shoots up immediately in response to his questions to Harry. As I point out in a pedagogic context, Snape turns out to be not only Harry’s nemesis but an equal-opportunity bad guy: dashing everyone’s expectations.35

“Tell me,” Snape asks Harry, “what would I get if I added powdered root of asphodel to an infusion of wormwood?” Asphodel is to be sure a poetic allusion, going back to the beginning of poetry itself and to Homer’s reference in the Odyssey to the fields of asphodel where the souls of the dead dwell in the underworld, and hence to Elysium, and the flower thus appears in this context in Milton, Tennyson, Longfellow and not less Oscar Wilde.36 It is more commonly pointed out that Snape’s

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35 Not even Harry’s who, if we read the book, starts out by assuming that Snape does not like him only to draw and even more dismal conclusions until the series’ ultimate peripety.

36 See for a discussion, particularly of Milton and also discussing asphodel and snakes, as well as with reference to ancient authors, aphrodisiac effects, the eponymous essay in Robert Graves, The Common Asphodel: Collected Essays on Poetry (1929-1944) (New York: Haskell House, 1970), pp. 327–330. See more recently, John W.P. Phillips, “Asphodel and the Spectral Places,” Derrida Today, 5, 2 (2012): 146–164. Phillips refers to Homer’s Odyssey Book 24, with the tiniest of worries on the part of this reader given his assumption that some parts of Homer’s poem were, for example, by the poet’s hand, as he implies, and some not, begging the Homer question by sidestepping it entirely. All is redeemed, however by the sections “Daffodils and Ashes,” pp 154ff. And see also, Anthony C. Dweck, “The Folklore of the Narcissus” in: Gordon R. Hanks, ed., Narcissus and Daffodil: The Genus Narcissus (London: Taylor & Francis, 2003), pp. 19–29. Dweck refers to Herrick’s invocation of “the daffodil as a potent of death” in Herrick’s Hesperides, “probably connecting the flower with the asphodel, which the ancient Greeks planted near tombs.” p. 24. And the connection then with asphodel explicates the inclusion of the daffodil in the list of “every flower that sad embroidery wears” in Milton’s
question seems to recall a love poem written by William Carlos Williams, *Asphodel, That Greeny Flower.*\(^{37}\) The range of poetic recollection can suggest at the very least that this was for Rowling an anagram of 'signatures' and thus the reference to alchemy, perfectly appropriate for a course on magic potions and a professor we are told that Rowling modeled on a severe (obviously) professor of chemistry.

It is for hermeneutic reasons that I am taking the time to detail a story and a film made for children, a story exporting a very English idea of school to other countries like France and Germany, Bulgaria and Romania as *Harry Potter* underlines the force of language. This works because one can hear this in the Latin of the spells as Rowling drew the magic of her book as a book about nothing so much as school from nothing other than, or less academically linguistically significant, than Latin as a signifier.

At issue is the power of a word to conjure important knowledge. The beginning of Goethe’s *Faust* corresponds to our aspiration to powers beyond our capacities and the limitations of our knowledge of those same limits. We recall Faust’s first incantation: *Thou, Spirit of the Earth, art nearer … I glow, as drunk with new made wine.*\(^{38}\) To this Spirit Faust cries *I feel thee draw my heart, absorb, exhaust me: / Thou must! thou must! And though my life it cost me!*\(^{39}\)

The invocation works, and Faust summons the Spirit of the Earth but the achievement is bootless — mortal beings cannot hope to comprehend the metaphysical as such (this is one of the reasons theology needs philosophy, for the same reasons of analogy and proportionate knowledge) as the spirit rebukes Faust:

```poetry
To view me is thine aspiration,
My voice to bear, my countenance to see;
Thy powerful yearning moveth me,
Here am I! — what mean perturbation
Thee, superhuman, shakes? Thy soul’s high calling, where?
Where is the breast, which from itself a world did bear,
And shaped and cherished—which with joy expanded,
To be our peer, with us, the Spirits, banded?
Where art thou Faust, whose voice has pierced to me,
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*Lycidas,* reading “Bid amaranthus all his beauty shed, / And daffadillies fill their cups with tears, / To strew the laureate hearse where Lycid lies.”

\(^{37}\) William Carlos Williams, *Asphodel, That Greeny Flower* (1955), begins as follows: “Of asphodel, that greeny flowery like a buttercup / upon its branching stem — / save that it’s green and wooden — / I come, my sweet, / to sing to you. / We lived long together / a life filled, / if you will, / with flowers. So that I was cheered / when I came first to know / that there were flowers also / in hell…”


\(^{39}\) Ibid.
Who towards me pressed with all thine energy?
He art thou, who, my presence breathing, seeing,
Trembles though all the depths of being,
A wrinkling worm, a terror-stricken form?40

For Faust, as in the case of the beginning invocation of the spirit of the earth (inspired by Herder’s poem, Das Kind der Sorge [The Child of Care]), for the conjurer, sorcerer, or natural philosopher, what matters is the right word perfectly chosen and precisely articulated: in the right way, for the right reason, above all: at the right time.

In the case of a religious rite, as in the case of the Greeks of antiquity or Tibetan monks today, the formula for a prayer, a magic spell or incantation, the right gesture, the right placement and poise, as well as the correct enunciation makes all the difference.

As a phenomenological philologist, Nietzsche would argue in his own studies of quantitative rhythm that the role of rhythm went beyond its capacity to entrain our souls to its objective force beyond ourselves, to move the gods themselves, the cosmos itself.41 When we get to science, so Nietzsche argues in The Gay Science, we tend to suppose that we can bracket rhythm, rhyme, together with every element of eloquence or rhetoric.

4. Science Wars

The so-called science wars, seem to have been thoroughly fought and decided beyond mention.42 Still we should ask: how are we to guard against today’s “dark arts”? Do we want to be shielded beyond the literal etheric waves of today’s internet or cell phone, WLAN access, all in addition to what Ivan Illich called the “age of the show,” all in addition to the manipulations of social media, called fake news, post-truth, and accusations of media bias and election hacking as we are captivated — this is the “Hallelujah Effect”43 — as surely as any hypnotic spell.

It seems certain to us that science and reason are the sole protections needed against whatever dark arts may be. For Nietzsche, science exists

40 Ibid., p. 19.
42 Cf. Isabelle Stengers, Cosmopolitiques 1 La guerre des sciences (Paris: La Découverte; Le Plessis-Robinson (Essonne), 1977).
less as an extension of Greek antiquity than owing to the “preludes” of both alchemy and religion. In the philosophy of science such claims tend to be resisted (although Pierre Duhem tells a counter story) painting the church as staunch opponent of science, holding back possible progress owing to its benightedness where, in accord with the received story, Galileo saves the day, contra the dark side, the forces of the inquisition (and the Dominicans were indeed quite dark in England, they are called the Blackfriars).

In his essays on *Science for a Free Society*, Paul Feyerabend reminds us that things are not quite so cut and dried when it came to Galileo, the ‘pushy patron saint of science.” As Feyerabend liked to put it in conversation with the author, Galileo should be considered “a crook.” Galileo was an opportunist, capable of giving his word (to Cardinal Bellarmine) and just as capable of breaking it. Speaking of the contest between rational discourse schemata or models, or more methodologically, in *Against Method* Feyerabend has pointed out that Galileo offers “arguments in appearance only” but makes the case he makes for science via rhetoric or, as Feyerabend’s own language is a bit harsh, “propaganda.” For Galileo only does what all science does. Thus Galileo “uses psychological tricks in addition to whatever reasons he has to offer.” If this seems harsh as a judgment because it contravenes a received prejudice concerning the objective manner in which we suppose modern science came to be modern science.

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46 To this extent what is really needed is a reading, perhaps this will take twenty or thirty years, perhaps this will never happen, between Bruno Latour’s and Steve Woolgar’s, *Laboratory Science: The Construction of Scientific Facts* (London: Sage, 1979) and Paul Feyerabend, with a chaser perhaps of John Ziman. See among his other studies, Ziman, *The Force of Knowledge: The Scientific Dimension of Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1976).

Feyerabend’s account follows the historical record more closely than the image that has endured to this day of Galileo as martyr, burned in effect (a fate that awaited not Galileo but Giordano Bruno) at the stake of the church. In our collective mythmaking, Galileo is reinvented as a saint of truth in the face of the dark ages and ‘dark’ arts of the church.

Science is the hero. And inasmuch as the Church no longer has the power to play the role of the dark forces, science must cast about for a suitably ‘dark’ enemy. This is the elegant inspiration that has inspired Bertolt Brecht’s *Galileo* as a kind of modern morality tale version of Jean Anouilh’s *Antigone*.

If we mean to insist that we alone have the truth, to be the arbiters of science, we also declare ourselves on side of the victors. This is Alan Sokal’s advance conclusion and this was the engine of his so-called “hoax.” For the same reason, after all these years and all the literature on the Sokal theme, who opposes Sokal? who would not simply applaud? Almost no one takes the side of ‘postmodern’ science in the so-called science wars, not even — although arguably he was an advance casualty in these “wars” for the soul of the rational academy — Bruno Latour.

At issue is authenticity as well as the right to be heard. Thus when Sokal, a physicist, asks « Are our philosophers imposters? » his antagonism is evident and Sokal takes the term broadly, including Donna Haraway along with Stanley Aronowitz in addition to Jacques Derrida and Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigaray, but arguably first on his list is Bruno Latour. Sokal’s ambition is to silence these voices, which tactic of nonmention is how scientific credentials/authority works in our day: who speaks, who doesn’t, who is mentioned, who is not. This too is citation practice, and it determines everything: who gets funding and who does not, thus determining nothing less literal than the “genesis and development” of today’s scientific facts.

48 On the theme of Galileo, Alan Chalmers is most comprehensive but there are others such as more sustainedly, Maurice Finocchiaro, *Defending Copernicus and Galileo: Critical Reasoning in the Two Affairs* (Frankfurt am Main: Springer, 2010). And in the history of science, see Nicholas Jolley or indeed the general shift in the field over the last twenty years.

49 I am making the points as Feyerabend has highlighted them both in his published work and in conversation with me, but the point is highly complex and involves as it were rhetoric all the way down. See for a slightly different reading, drawing on Stengers, see Yolande Pelchat, *L’obsession de la différence: récit d’une biotechnologie* (Laval, Canada: Presses Université Laval, 2003).

50 Indeed one could not begin to list this literature here. There are web pages dedicated to offering a partial bibliography, there is even a Wikipedia entry.


52 Scientists themselves conspicuously suffer from this. Thus a recent example in the popular press notes that research into the cause of Alzheimers is dedicated money,
Elsewhere I write on what we are doing when we dismiss the work of a university scientist by belittling him as a “pseudoscientist.” This is rhetoric, this is discipline and punishment, and it makes and breaks careers. I have thus written about the so-called AIDS denialist Peter Duesberg but I could also be speaking of the Nobel prize winning chemist Luc Montagnier not with respect to AIDS denialism for his part but when as a chemist he had the temerity to research the chemical foundations of homeopathy.

In the same way, this again is a political tactic, as it makes all the scholarly difference who one places in one’s bibliography: who is mentioned, who is left out altogether. This is science by damnation and it is part of the reason analytic philosophy (that means philosophy in general today) cites as sparsely as it does.\textsuperscript{53} The sobriquet of “damnation” is not derived from Sartre’s notion of Hell much less Apollinaire or Baudelaire but the Bronx archivalist of science facts (cataloging the fate of facts refused as facts), Charles Fort (1871-1932), author of The Book of the Damned.\textsuperscript{54}

At stake in the science wars is what is at stake under the rubric of pseudoscience, which we may also call Junk Science,\textsuperscript{55} Gerald Holton

\textsuperscript{53} I make this case with respect to Ludwik Fleck who is both well-established (and hence popular) and constantly denigrated in the literature, a bad ambiguity as one might say, ongoing since his book, originally published in 1935 was translated into English: On the Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), including a Foreword by Thomas Kuhn and as one can also read the French translation including a post-face by Bruno Latour): Fleck, Génése et développement d’un fait scientifique, Nathalie Jas, trans. (Paris : Champs scientifique, 2008).


\textsuperscript{55} But this term too needs to be considered and coded: what is junk? Why so? In science as such the term itself has seen revisions. Sere for one example, the interview (with Stephen Hall): “Hidden Treasures in Junk DNA. What was once known as junk DNA turns out to hold hidden treasures, says computational biologist Ewan Birney” Scientific American, Oct. 12 (2012). Cf. Thierry Bardini, Junkware (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011).
spoke of *Hocus-Pocus* in his autobiography to refer to this and, echoes of Slytherin, we also speak of ‘Snake Oil,’ a colloquial term covering every-thing from Montessori teaching to acupuncture, homeopathy, and vita-mins and even being opposed to Monsanto (now Bayer) as if it were irra-tional to oppose a company that uses poisons for fertilizer and GMO as, among other things, techniques to render seed sterile as a method of con-trolling the market for seeds.

The first in the list above is pseudoscience, the term of choice today. Note the normativity of the term and all of us prefer the hero to the anti-hero. This is what made Rickman’s Snape so unsettling throughout the decade of Harry Potter films. The pseudo is a phony, we are fooled if we accept appearances, and who, as Nietzsche reflected in his extramoral essay on truth and lie, wants to be hoodwinked?56

At issue here is still the question of the relation between analytic and continental philosophy as that inevitably involves philosophy and science. Where philosophy has traditionally served as handmaiden or servant — the old word is ‘ancilla’ — to theology, *sine qua non* for theological reflec-tion, the new modus of philosophy has ambitions to serve not theology but science. The trouble is that philosophy would like to serve science as master: telling science what it can and cannot do.

There are troubles with this ambition and the physicists have been re-luctant to welcome the philosophers as methodological instructors or log-ical coaches. Thus Steven Hawking declared, some years ago attracting media attention — and never bothering to retract the claim — “Philoso-phy is dead.”57

As part of the same normative impetus, Sokal’s polemic too was writ-ten contra those he believed ought to be eliminated from university and intellectual and even popular and casual discourse. After the deployment of his hoax, Sokal continued his attacks against “The Philosophical Mysti-fications of Professor Latour.”58 Writing in *Le Monde*, Sokal lumped

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56 The pseudos are our new postmoderns, just where the word “post,” like the word “trans,” has become rather a term of approbation. Performance Philosophy Colloquium: *Post-Internet Philosophy*, Berlin, May 2016.

57 This proclamation made the news, with all the ‘impact’ philosophers might be looking for in a public intellectual, thus reporting on Google’s Zeitgeist Confer-ence held earlier in Hertfordshire, Matt Warman writes that “Stephen Hawking tells Google ‘philosophy is dead,’” *Telegraph*, 17 May 2011.

58 Sokal, « Les mystifications philosophiques du professeur Latour, » Publié, sous le titre « Pourquoi j’ai écrit ma parodie » *Le Monde*, 31 January 1997. This did not go away quietly, to be sure. See Joerg Lau, „Bescheidwisser in die Politik.“ March 7, 2002, *Die Zeit*, 11/2002. The argument here in 2002 against ‘political ecology’ and against indeed the ecology of things, of non-human objects has in the interim gone over in the field of political theory and philosophy not to mention media ecology to Latour’s side, at least and arguably more rather than not. Lau’s essay was writ-
Latour together with Haraway and Aronowitz, as those who ought not write about science. What Sokal says about Latour, a fair amount of it elliptical, includes this damning paragraph:

I will not detail for the readers of *Le Monde*, explicating the « scientific formation » manifested by Latour in his essay on the Einsteinian theory of relativity, that which was presented as a « contribution to the sociology of the delegation » (*Social Studies of Science* 18, pages 3–44, 1988). These details appear in the book Jean Bricmont and myself are currently in the process of writing on *The scientific impostures of (post) modern philosophers*. Suffice it to say that certain colleagues suspect that Latour’s article was, just as mine was, a parody.

Sokal does not stop with this rhetorical move — a kind of *you ain’t seen nothing yet*, in New York English — Sokal then but plays the science card, natural scientist contra social scientist, distinguishing *inexact* from *exact* sciences, a rank-ordering move, i.e., my science is more scientific than yours:

Latour accordingly pretends to address the sociology of science but his expose is confused: he mixes up ontology and epistemology and attacks claims that no one holds. « In place of recognizing a science holding absolute exactitude in its knowledge, one recognizes in its place the quality of the collective experience it demonstrates” — yet who today claims that science furnishes ‘absolute exactitudes.’

At issue is expert power and public voice: who should speak and who should not.59

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59 Most readers went along with Sokal, with the exception of myself, back in 1996 in an essay I published in *Telos* and long available on the internet as a result of a University of Chicago ‘Focusing,’ a conference organized by Gene Gendlin, and including contributions from Patrick Heelan, and again in 1997 in *Common Knowledge* (with Feyerabend) along with a summary essay of the Sokal affair, cited below, in 2002. Another exception, also from 2002, is John Guillory’s more widely received discussion on behalf of literature (or cultural criticism): “The Sokal Affair and the History of Criticism,” *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Winter, 2002): 470–528, among not too many others.
What is at stake is not the fate of continental and analytic philosophy in France or Germany or Italy and so on (analytic philosophy is increasingly dominant everywhere) but the science wars as fought and, so it seems, concluded. This is the Scylla and Charybdis between which the researcher must adjust his or her language so as to get published.

Citation frequency is the measure of academic “impact” and hence it is the key to the life of the professional university mind. As noted above this is a very Hegelian thematic: what matters is recognition, acknowledgment, visibility, being seen. In turn, because we are reflective animals, this is how one knows that one exists, thus one shares the same consensus of impact and convention and the ruling measure of truth is by peer review, which is how grants are apportioned, how colleagues engage (or, and this is far more common: fail to engage) with one’s work. To the degree to which we are — just as the poet Hölderlin once beautifully said, a conversation, and to the degree then that we can hear from one another — we will need to follow this accord. Hölderlin is speaking of Deutscher Gesang and the Pflege, the care, observance, of the solid letter, diefeste Buchstabe.

In the next section, I focus on the language of the science wars and what can be called pseudo-science. The winner, in advance is physics and cosmology. Inasmuch as philosophy hopes to be part of that it is inconvenient that the physicist, Stephen Hawking dismisses philosophy, by which Hawking could only mean analytic philosophy if only because there is today only analytic style philosophy at British universities.

5. Les « Pseudos »: Science vs. Pseudoscience

Given the economic constraints of the current day in the academy, the growing trend in almost all disciplines is that of suppression by threat: say what everyone else says or (and this is a real and working threat) you won’t be hired, tenured, published, or indeed read. Thus non-citation of outlier views is neither accident nor error, yielding nothing less than what Thomas Kuhn called “normal science,” everything else is ‘damned.’ Thus we read in Latour’s recent reflections on the ‘disciplining’ of anthropology, that a philosophic sociology of ethnographic science as Latour practiced this (note that this entails that his own reflection is what Giddens and Ginev name a double hermeneutics) will be forever barred from observing the practice of the ‘whites,’ in this case redoubling his doubled hermeneutics. Here the ‘whites’ refer to the natural sciences them-

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60 Babich, La fin de la pensée.
selves, entailing that anthropology and other social sciences (the ‘blacks’) are excluded from the greater philosophic conversation on science.

Thus in a study that began as a reflection on a book about Étienne Souriau’s ‘different’ and scientific ‘modes d’existence,’62 Latour invited open exchange on his own involvement with the movement in philosophy known as the ‘speculative turn’.63 The Souriau text to which Latour, along with his co-editor Isabelle Stengers, referred was initially published in 1943,64 and the exploration for Latour explains his own apparently contradictory approach to anthropology of science exactly qua philosophy of science.

In Latour’s We Have Never Been Modern65 (the first contribution of its kind since Pierre Duhem’s otherwise little-received German Science66 to what might be counted as a national or ‘territorial’ geography of science), Latour made the important argument that we “whites” continue to fail to put ourselves as investigators in question. Although Latour does not make a connection with Nietzsche, he might have done so. Nor does Latour emphasize the terminology of continental philosophy of science, invoking neither phenomenology nor hermeneutics, while pointing to that very same ideal, Dilthey- and Heidegger- and Nietzsche-style or even Ricoeur-style or Gadamer-style hermeneutics, a lack of which continues as methodological deficit to limit philosophy of science including ethnography.

63 The text was also called OOO and there are other names) It is true to say that Latour engaged this movement quite in his own fashion (this has ever been his wont) going beyond what some analytic (and some self-describedly so) ‘continental’ scholars might call ‘experimental philosophy’ towards what mattered for Latour and his studies of laboratory science including his turn to political ontology and thus to things environmentally, empirically encountered as we find them as they act. As Latour explained (and he meant this literally, even if it would turn out to have disputed significance for those outsider scholars who took his internet-disseminated call seriously): “I invite my co-investigators to help me find the guiding thread of the experience by becoming attentive to several regimes of truth, which I call modes of existence, after the strange book by Etienne Souriau, recently republished, that features this phrase in its title” Latour, “Biography of an Investigation: On a Book about Modes of Existence. Draft of an article for a dossier on AIME,” Archives de philosophie, coordinated by Bruno Karsenti, translated by Cathy Porter, (2012): 1–20, here p. 1.
64 Souriau, Les différents modes d’existence.
To “the classical question of philosophy ‘what is the being of technology, science, religion?’” is to be added, on Latour’s reading, the question favoured by so-called object-oriented ontology, which Latour rearticulates, thereby “pluralizing” the question: “what are the beings appropriate to technology, science, religion, and how have the Moderns tried to approach them?” If Latour does not invoke hermeneutics, he nevertheless details its practice with reference to his own teacher at Dijon, André Malet. Following the good protestant hermeneutics of Bultmann, Latour reflects that the “science” of reading (another way to speak of hermeneutics) including classical and theological philology also presupposes the same anthropology of reception that in a quite separate instance of reflective hermeneutics, likewise not named as such, Pierre Hadot dedicated to his own account of the history of the reception of St Augustine in his *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, regarding the accession to the academy as such, but not less regarding the rise and fall of interpretation of philosophical rigour. The point here is not that Hadot was (or should have been) Latour’s reference. At issue is only that Latour leaves out the word hermeneutics speaking of nothing other than hermeneutics:

the Biblical text finally became comprehensible, revealed as a lengthy process of transformations, inventions, glosses, and diversifications which, taken together, sketched out a layer of interpretations that played out — this is the essential point — each in its own way the question of fidelity or treason: faithful or falsified invention, impious reworking or astounding rediscovery?

No one less than Clifford Geertz introduced the tactic of talking hermeneutics without saying hermeneutics, a clever move inasmuch as one thereby assumes the author has invented the tradition and method all by himself, lock, stock, and cockfight barrel. Of course Latour is also telling his readers and himself, the story of his life (in spite of his denial cum affirmation of this same report: “Not to tell my life story — if a system is solid, one need not be overly concerned with its author — but rather to sketch the biography.”). If I am not defending Latour, he does that: telling us not only that he knows of “no other author who has so stubbornly

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pursued the same research project for twenty-five years, day after day, while filling up the same files in response to the same sets of questions” but also that, together with “a wife and child he had discovered in “the Abidjan of 1973-75… all at once the most predatory forms of capitalism, the methods of ethnography, and the puzzles.” Latour retraces the history of the effects of this insight in his more recent book as a sign and invitation to his own further researches to the height of persuasion, such that the reversals or better said: obstacles he would encounter along the way (the iconic locus of Princeton’s Institute for Advanced Study would have to loom large here) would remain desolations to remain with him to this day.

For Latour,

one puzzling question in particular that has never left me: why do we use the ideas of modernity, the modernizing frontier, the contrast between modern and premodern, before we even apply to those who call themselves civilizers the same methods of investigation that we apply to the “others” — those whom we claim, if not to civilize entirely then at least to modernize a little?

These ‘others’ in an age of sustainable war, conducted both on the ground and at a distance via drone (ironically, Alan Rickman’s last film is a work of propaganda dramatizing the moral values of drone warfare) and, including warzone emigrants as well as people of color as they also have long included women, trans—gender and otherwise, including the asexual and the disabled as persons we routinely fail to see on their own terms. I will not be able to develop this point here as it deserves but we might apply it to the distinction to be drawn between science and pseudoscience as philosophers of science might demarcate the same, as well as to the status to be claimed in order to be named a philosopher of science like Ludwik Fleck or like Heidegger or like Nietzsche. Thus Latour reflects on what he names a “flagrant asymmetry,” which we may also regard as the default of hermeneutics, simple and above all doubled or reflexive, observing as the key question perhaps of social science as a science that

… the Whites anthropologized the Blacks, yes, quite well, but they avoided anthropologizing themselves. Or else they did so in a falsely distant, “exotic” fashion, by focusing on the most archaic aspects of their own society –
I have here retraced Latour’s path from Abidjan to San Diego in search of symmetry (and asymmetry) as illuminated by nothing less rebus-like than the cover of Latour and Woolgar’s *Laboratory Life* ([1979] 1986), not the fatal subtitle *The Construction of Scientific* (I write about this elsewhere)76 but to the fact and the problem of the fact that the introduction was composed by Jonas Salk.

Latour’s transgression of the code of the academy — it was not a “violation” of scientific objectivity — took him to his on-going success (or influence) in the guise of his own study of neuropeptides qua actors qua actants, and that ‘violation’ was his attention to the scientists themselves in the laboratory itself. Frank L. Baum’s wizard knew what he was doing when he warned Dorothy not to look at the man behind the curtain.

Instructively Latour’s success crystalized when his attention shifted to the things themselves, the objects as such, the ‘nonhuman characters’. Yet this meant that one excluded the human from the human sciences, the human agency of human agents, as such along with human social practice. No matter, a focus on the ‘non-human characters’ would be enough:

I suddenly understood that the non-human characters had their own adventures that we could track, so long as we abandoned the illusion that they were ontologically different from the human characters. The only thing that counted was their agency, their power to act and the diverse figurations they were given.77

This question of investigation and influence returns, as every reader of Latour’s reflections will go on to discover for themselves and to rediscover for the rest of their lives. Here it is enough to presage the point in terms of Latour’s own rueful parenthesis, musing on what response he might have had had one ever indeed thought to ask him about his own ‘philosophy’:

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75 Ibid., p. 5.
76 Note the scare word ‘construction’ as this would perturb both Ian Hacking and not less Bruno Latour himself as critics (not only the likes of Alan Sokal) turned the term against them by using it to characterize their own work—this sensitivity engendered no fewer than two books one by Hacking and another, earlier at the same press by Latour.
Rules and the roles of demarcation remain and in Latour’s little list of relativized damnations, Feyerabend’s famous damnation, *astrology* — duly deployed, as noted at the outset, if only to denigrate Derrida — no longer rates a mention.

For normative reasons when I presented a lecture on Fleck, first at *Fleck Zentrum* in Zürich and then to anthropologists including linguistic ethnographers and medical anthropologists at a German university, suggesting in the course of my presentation that one might take a cautionary hint from Latour in their own application of their own field to medical anthropology, be it with respect to the disease presentation of AIDS specific to Africa or Southeast Asia (this was my primary concern given my work on Duesenberg) or even perhaps when investigating the role of witchcraft and other agencies in illness or reflecting on the working assumptions of *Aryurvedic* medicine, my colleagues in ethnography, despite their vastly greater knowledge of the culture in question were clear that they wished to distance themselves from Latour: they did not agree with him, they told me. When I went on to suggest that without Latour one also might not have room for hermeneutics of the kind I argued for, and that the casualty of such exclusions was nothing less than critique, meaning that science studies itself was in danger of thought control, they dismissed the notion. Latour’s “transgression” was too much: the ruling view would not be put in question and, on reflection I must say — include myself in saying that my interlocutors had, in Latour’s own terms, never been modern. Instead, their more modest and for their students, let me underline this point, their admirable goal, was one that is well-ensconced into the university game plan, to train young anthropologists of science and land them on the only side of the debate on which jobs and grants are to be had. At the *Université François-Rabelais* in Tours, in the summer of 2016, that would still be part of the problem, especially if one raises the question of those individuals closed out of the same, for reasons of dissonant accents and question of gender difference and emigrant status as well as unreceived views on the sciences, like hermeneutics.

6. Going Beyond Good and Evil

Recall Nietzsche’s (utterly anti-feminist) reflection in his *Beyond Good and Evil*.

It is « the slave » in the vain man’s blood, a remnant of the craftiness of the slave ...which seeks to *seduce* him to good opinions about himself; it is likewise the slave who immediately afterwards falls down before these opinions as if he himself had not called them forth. (BGE §261)

If this vanity is an atavism as Nietzsche says, what else drives our responses to books, to looks, to Facebook and Twitter but also to our colleagues and our university research interests? Where in the face of all these ‘prejudices’ as Nietzsche speaks of them, as he argues that such prejudices characterize not only philosophy but also science and even logic and mathematics, where shall we find the old enlightenment ideals of objectivity, science, truth? Or is this merely another part of the problem?

For there is the question of the black and the white, are they good, are they bad as Foucault would *say* even if, as in the case of Rickman’s Snape, they turn out to be *really good* after seeming to be *really bad*?

What can we, what *ought* we do about negative appearances? And the question of so-called *erotic capital* mentioned above? Is such erotic capital real? Indeed, for whom is this erotic? For whom is this capital? (These too are questions addressed in *The Hallelujah Effect*). Are such questions different from the criticisms already raised by 19th century feminists regarding prostitution, legal and illegal, of a socially respectable as opposed to an unrespectable variety?

Is there not a need to raise the broader question of society and capital altogether?

What about rhetoric? If I mention Snape, I am also talking about the actor Alan Rickman, thus this is an issue of performance practice: what about assonance, that is: music, speech, and rhythm?

Do we give ourselves away by our manner of speech? Speaking French in France as a non-native speaker? Or speaking with a different accent in English? Or a different *Mundart* in German? What does our manner of speaking say about us? In different cultures there are different responses to speech, and perhaps what is most significant is the “foreign-er,” as Hölderlin would say, where we have, as it were, not only lost our tongue in foreign lands but where just this experience can bring us to ourselves just by bringing us to an awareness of the conversation that we, all of us, are.

79 “The danger of language for the freedom of the spirit. Every word is *prejudice*,” Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Wanderer and His Shadow*, §55.
And finally, a third question, recall the reflections on science and pseudo-science, and the “science wars” initiated by the angers of an American physicist who was grievously concerned that non-physicists like Latour and Kristeva and Derrida had the audacity to use words affiliated with his proprietary science and to do so in ways he found unrecognizable. Sokal’s *resentment*, as Nietzsche has analyzed this, inspired what Sokal claimed as his hoax, a “faux-*parody*,80 a campaign conducted in order to silence talk he did not like, and thereby and there is no end to this, inaugurating the campaign contra all the “imposters” he saw everywhere in the academy, in sociology, in linguistics, in anthropology and above all in French philosophy, in the person of Jean-François Lyotard, who wrote the *Postmodern Condition*, and Jacques Derrida as well as the same Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari who wrote the *Anti-Oedipus* Latour cited as influential for him above, to all of this we may also add everything suspected as “pseudo.”

Thus I suggest that we begin to question the motivations behind the project of naming the practice of science we do not like, even as practiced by scientists themselves, “pseudo-science.” In addition we may wonder in general about academic *resentment*, about our reasons for belittling those we do not like not by giving arguments against their readings but characterizing their work in sum as ‘bad’ philosophy, or as ‘bad’ philology or as bad linguistics or bad sociology? What work is done by such dyadic coding and how shall we rank proposals, “modest” or otherwise?

I do not have answers, but I have the beginning of a suggestion. Recall, as noted above, Nietzsche’s observation that “every word is a prejudice” and his reflection on complexity, also quoted in Tracy Strong’s 1988 citation of this reflection in *The Gay Science*, “unspeakably more depends on what things are called, than on what they are.”81

The aphorism carries the title *Only as Creators!*, reflecting the “socio-linguistics” of the philologist Nietzsche, the kernel of what becomes his insight into the genealogy of values. For Nietzsche had argued that the

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80 See Swift’s “Modest proposal” (1729) for an example of the latter.
81 Nietzsche goes on to write: “The reputation, the name and appearance, the importance, the usual measure and weight of things each being in origin most frequently an error and arbitrariness thrown over the things like a garment, and quite alien to their essence and even to their exterior have gradually, by the belief therein and its continuous growth from generation to generation, grown as it were on-and-into things and become their very body; the appearance at the very beginning becomes almost always the essence in the end, and operates as the essence! What a fool he would be who would think it enough to refer here to this origin and this nebulous veil of illusion, in order to annihilate that which virtually passes for the world namely, so-called ‘reality’! It is only as creators that we can annihilate! But let us not forget this: it suffices to create new names and valuations and probabilities, in order in the long run to create new ‘things.’”
slave revolt in values is, the only successful revolution in values that the world has ever known (2000 years as Nietzsche will also say in his Anti-christ, without a single new god), deployed, it took Deleuze to fully analyse this, solely by way of names of figurations, like black and white hats. Qua fluid, expressing a formative, a transformative will to power simply because everything is will to power, everything can be set on its head.

Thus the victory over the ancient masters, the Romans, is effected via Jerusalem but not as an expression of the hatred that Jews continue to have for their antique masters, for any master. Instead of hate and exclusion, revenge is effected through its reverse: through denial, through nailing the instrument of this hate to the cross, and denying it with all one’s force.

So it goes, Nietzsche argues, and thus is effected the most powerful kind of revenge, the only durable kind, “spiritual revenge”

In opposition to the aristocratic value equations (good = noble = powerful = beautiful = fortunate = loved by god), the Jews, with an awe-inspiring consistency, dared to reverse things and to hang on to that with the teeth of the most profound hatred (the hatred of the powerless),

that is, to

“only those who suffer are good; the poor, the powerless, the low are the only good people; the suffering, those in need, the sick, the ugly are also the only pious people; only they are blessed by God; for them alone there is salvation.—By contrast, you privileged and powerful people, you are for all eternity the evil, the cruel, the lecherous, the insatiable, the godless; you will also be the unblessed, the cursed, and the damned for all eternity!”

(GM I: 7)

This initial revaluation of values is effected via names, what things are called. That is the key achievement of this reversal of values, as it is also the Cartesian secret to modernity, as Nietzsche reminds us, sober and postmodern, ironic, disenchanted as he was at the end of his 19th century reflection in On the Genealogy of Morals, which would thus be another key text for a hermeneutics of science as for a sociolinguistics of science inasmuch as Nietzsche’s genealogy of morals is articulated via nothing less than an exploration of names, what things are called, the language we use, whereby as he says everything is soundly advanced, apace, “everything is becoming visibly Judaized, Christianized.” (Ibid.)

The revaluation of values makes the bird of prey responsible for being a bird of prey but the real achievement lies in thereby transforming inaction, non-action, into action, thus making something out of nothing, whereby the lamb’s vulnerability becomes both the sign of election-
and true superiority on the part of the lamb. One chooses to turn the other cheek. With this the above value equation is inverted.

For Nietzsche’s *Umwertung* revaluing values, one needs only to change the names. One renames and without changing anything everything is changed. This is accomplished through the imposition of subjective responsibility not on one’s own part but on the part of the other. The slave, our little lamb, claims that weakness is a choice, that one can act otherwise, and thereby the slave (this is also the key to Stoic morality) imposes the same subjective choice on the part of the master, the eagle, who is now convicted of subjective guilt or deliberate intentionality as the claim will now be that the eagle could have acted otherwise.

If one doesn’t care to talk about pseudoscience in the case of Latour who speaks of the “political ontology” of things or else of nature as such, i.e., “the environment” (and above we noted that Sokal criticized precisely this with respect to Latour), or else of animals, as in the case of Will Kymlicka and Sue Donaldson in their book *Zoopolis*, or else the political theorist Jonathan Gray reflecting on Western culture’s ‘others’ in his own book *Straw Dogs* where Gray analyzes, painfully, the 19th century genocide, complete; by the end of the 19th century, of the Tasmanians, down to the last living male, or any of the many insightful authors who write in and around these themes, if one has another subject matter for one’s research one can assume that none of this affects one as a scholar.

Inasmuch as one believes in equality, freedom, and brotherhood, all the great ideals of the revolution, one is implicated. The ideals of the enlightenment entail that one believes fairness is possible, that one has options, and, even Simone de Beauvoir believed this, that one’s colleagues in the academy are indeed one’s colleagues, aligned with one in the profession, or that, as a student or aspirant to the academy, that one has a fair shot.

But as we can perhaps now begin to see, after the discussion of Latour in the Sokal affair and as I have sought to situate the debate of the science wars and today in terms of so-called pseudoscience, the struggle continues. It is the same to be found arguably in the America of Occupy Wall Street, not that that movement had any effect whatever, thus the 1% remains in control of everything, and thus there are all kind of capital in a culture of fascist capitalism, which is today’s military industrial complex:

for women everywhere, for people of every color and every orientation, to be the other, is to be excluded.

7. Analytic vs continental philosophy of science

From the complexity of the unspeakable real to a judgment, let us ask again, again quoting Foucault, “are they good, are they bad?” Recall our earlier question: who judges? The only judgments that count are those of academics and in the case of philosophy these are as we have seen nearly always a judgment of an analytic kind. Solve the problems and be done with the problem.

With enough clarity, suppose a sufficiency of solved problems, resolved case studies, one can suppose the end of philosophy to be at hand, not dissimilar from the judgment Stephen Hawking makes. Perhaps philosophy is dead? Perhaps, from the point of view of analytic philosophy, that might be a good thing?

By contrast, traditional or classical continental philosophy does not use the tactics of analytic philosophy and so seeks less to resolve or solve problems than it seeks to understand such problems. Continental philosophy privileges questioning: thus Nietzsche raises questions, just as Heidegger offers a hermeneutic phenomenology of questioning as questioning. And far from privileging the place of science in the first rank, traditional continental philosophy also attends to the human condition, including the resources of poetry, mythology, everydayness as such, to which, in the sections above, I added a reflection on film figures of the popular collective unconscious, including performance practice, such as that of Alan Rickman in his portrayals of Hogwarts professors of witchcraft and wizardry as well as of British generals directing decisions in today’s drone warfare.

By raising questions, continental philosophy is committed to critique as much as it is committed to critical thinking. But if analytic philosophy is increasingly the only kind of philosophy taught at universities today — this hegemony goes back the entirety of my philosophical life— it is a tradition that refuses to be limited in any way. Taking itself as the whole of philosophy, analytic philosophy refuses to recognize any other approach as philosophy relegating anything other than itself as, and at best, ‘history of philosophy’ and discounting as “bad” philosophy or even as “not philosophy” all other traditions of philosophical reflection, especially more complicated traditions, including hermeneutic phenomenology.

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do justice to science, natural and social, to do justice to our culture, to do justice even to the very idea of justice, we need everything philosophy has to offer, all of its parts, all of its voices, all of its traditions, all of its nuances: we need the pluralism we began by noting.

This essay thus pointed to the central and broadening value of the work Ginev does in the philosophy of science, along with Heelan and Kockelmans, and many others concerned to explore the varieties of hermeneutic philosophies of science, phenomenological philosophies of science, genealogical and philological and social epistemological philosophies of science, no one of which may be dispensed with for the sake of thinking as such, especially for thinking about science.